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Prefrontal cortex has been considered to implement processes such as attention, which control informa-
tion stored elsewhere. In this issue of Neuron, Ester et al. (2015) demonstrate it also stores precise
stimulus-specific information, questioning assumed neuroanatomical distinctions between storage and
control.In a world that is usually highly predict-
able, our optimal responses are likewise
usually scripted. The tried and true way
in which you make coffee every morning
requires less effort, and is more likely to
result in coffee, than if you devised a
new method each morning. The brain
quickly learns regularities in our environ-
ment and develops habitual responses
to each expected situation. However,
the brain must also constantly monitor
for whether the environment is still the
same as past experience would predict.
We must be able to think and behave
flexibly if the environment changes and
the optimal response becomes unclear
(such as when the coffee maker breaks).
How do we select and remember the
pieces of information that are currently
most important, and combine them to
create a solution to this new problem?
How do we keep in mind that the current
situation is different from usual and thus
prevent ourselves from behaving in our
old, habitual ways?
This flexible control of information and
behavior has been called ‘‘executive pro-
cessing,’’ and it has been shown by more
than 100 years of neuropsychological
research to depend critically on the pre-
frontal cortex (PFC, e.g., Stuss and
Benson, 1986). Exactly how the PFC ac-
complishes these feats, however, has
been the subject of much debate. PFC is
unique in that it receives converging in-
puts from all sensory domains. PFC neu-
rons appear to carry information about
whatever is currently relevant—with dy-
namic, multiplexed signals combining
information about recent stimuli with
potential responses and contextual rules(e.g., Stokes at al., 2013). Such flexibility
in neural selectivity, coupled with the
wide range of tasks whose performance
is affected by PFC damage, contrasts
with the specificity and more rigid struc-
ture of sensory cortices. Differences in
anatomy and physiology between frontal
and posterior cortices have sometimes
been interpreted as indicating that PFC
is solely an executive processing region
and does not represent sensory informa-
tion, merely accessing and controlling
information stored elsewhere. Stimulus-
related information in PFC has been inter-
preted as being qualitatively different,
because it can be more abstract, more
categorical, and not consistent across in-
dividuals or across time (e.g., Freedman
et al., 2003). In this issue of Neuron, Ester
et al. (2015) provide evidence that brings
into question both of these interpreta-
tions. They find that active representa-
tions of sensory information do exist in
PFC during short-term memory tasks,
and the format and precision of those rep-
resentations is similar to that in other
cortical areas. There may be less of a di-
chotomy between prefrontal and sensory
cortices than previously thought.
The proposed dichotomy between
frontal and sensory cortices is rooted in
cognitive models that conceptualize the
storage of information as distinct from
the control of that information. Classic
models of working memory (e.g., Badde-
ley and Hitch, 1974), and of the control
of short-term and long-term memory
more generally, posit modules for storage
that are separate from executive control
processes, and this distinction is partially
supported by behavioral and neural data.Neuron 87In part, the evidence suggests that active
information storage in working memory
relies on different, partially independent
stores for different types of information,
while executive processes are more
domain-general. Based on neuropsycho-
logical data and cognitive behavioral ex-
periments, Baddeley and Hitch (1974)
proposed domain-specific modules for
the separate storage of verbal and visuo-
spatial information. The visuospatial
sketch pad has been further subdivided
into visual and spatial stores (Logie
1995). Neuroimaging studies support
distinctions between three information
types: verbal, spatial, and nonverbal/
nonspatial aspects of object identity
(e.g., review Courtney, 2004). Other infor-
mation, such as semantic or relational,
may also be maintained in working mem-
ory, and each may have its own neural
substrate. Consistent with the idea of
storage being mediated by sensory
cortices, sensory cortices are also typi-
cally ‘‘domain specific,’’ such that early
visual cortex and early auditory cortex
process only visual or auditory informa-
tion, respectively. Moreover, within visual
cortex, for example, there are regions that
are preferentially involved in processing
motion, facial identity, and so on.
In contrast, executiveprocessesappear
to be ‘‘domain-general.’’ One can perform
a verbal task and a spatial task concur-
rently more easily than two verbal or
two spatial tasks, but there remains a
common resource demand such that
doing two tasks concurrently is more diffi-
cult, slower, and error-prone than doing
the two tasks separately. This interference
effect is more pronounced the higher the, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 681
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Previewsexecutive demands of the tasks, regard-
less of overlap in the sensory domains.
These findings support the idea that exec-
utive function is qualitatively different from
the highly structured, domain-specific
systems for perception and storage of
sensory information. The central executive
was conceptualized as a controller of
information, but not something that con-
tained representations of information
itself. It needed to be flexible enough to
deal with any type of information. It
seemed (and still seems) implausible that
a neural system that is flexible enough
to control any type of information would
be able to also represent any type of infor-
mation with good precision and fidelity
since it would not have the highly struc-
tured neuroanatomy andmodular special-
ization of sensory cortex. These ideas
suggested a qualitatively different neural
basis, such as PFC, with its highly integra-
tive circuits and flexible responses of indi-
vidual neurons. The association of these
processes with PFC then implied that
PFC would not store stimulus-specific
information.
Research over the last three decades,
however, has debated exactly how inte-
grated and flexible PFC is. Particularly
in humans, but also in nonhuman pri-
mates, it is now clear that there is a
complex organization across different re-
gions of PFC, but it remains unclear what
the nature of that organization is (Court-
ney 2004). The debate has often been
couched as one of ‘‘domain-specificity’’
versus ‘‘process-specificity’’ (e.g., Levy
and Goldman-Rakic, 2000). A domain-
specific organization would mean that
PFC, like sensory and motor cortices, is
organized according to type of infor-
mation. A process-specific organization
would mean that PFC is instead orga-
nized according to the type of cognitive
process, such as selection versus
manipulation. If the process-specific
areas within PFC could depend on ac-
cess to stored representations in other
cortical areas, then PFC might not need
to have specialized circuits to represent
all the different types of information itself,
and neuroanatomical organization solely
by type of process would be more
efficient.
Process-specificorganization, however,
neither necessarily precludes domain-
specific organization nor stimulus repre-682 Neuron 87, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevsentation (e.g., Johnson et al., 2003). There
has been much evidence for domain-spe-
cific organization within the prefrontal
cortex (e.g., Levy and Goldman-Rakic,
2000; Courtney 2004), including areas
with retinotopic organization (Hagler and
Sereno, 2006) and neurons with stimulus-
specific responses. The neural coding of
the stimulus information, however, was
thought to be merely categorical or so
integrated with other task parameters that
it might seem better considered as
representing task rules and context rather
than the remembered stimulus itself
(e.g., Quintana et al., 1988; Freedman
et al., 2003; Stokes et al., 2013). Previous
attempts to identify neural codes of
stimuli maintained over a working memory
delay using fMRI have found such
representations in sensory areas, even in
early sensory areas that do not show
elevatedsustainedactivityduring thedelay
(e.g., Harrison and Tong, 2009; review in
D’Esposito and Postle, 2015), but have
not been able to find evidence of such
representations in PFC. An influential
interpretation of this lack of evidence has
been that the elevated delay period activity
observed in prefrontal cortex, even that
which is clearly domain specific, reflects
cognitive control processes required for
the tasks rather than active stimulus-
specific memory representations (e.g.,
D’Esposito and Postle, 2015). In their cur-
rent study, Ester and colleagues used
an inverted encoding model approach,
which they directly demonstrate is more
sensitive than previously used multivoxel
pattern classification methods. The previ-
ously usedmethodsweresensitiveenough
to detect consistent patterns reflecting
stimulus-specific memory activity in areas
with more homogeneous cell populations
where similarly tuned cells are more rigidly
clustered into a columnar organization,
but they do not appear to be sensitive
enough to detect these representations
in PFC. Moreover, Ester et al. (2015)
find that these frontal representations of
stimulus orientation have continuous tun-
ing curves, similar to those in parietal and
occipital cortex, rather than categorical
responses. Ester et al. (2015) find that
multiple brain areas, in occipital, parietal,
and prefrontal cortices all contain informa-
tion about the to-be-remembered stim-
ulus. Some of these areas, but not all,
also have elevated overall levels of BOLDier Inc.MRI signal. Other areas have elevated
overall signal during the working memory
delay, but do not contain remembered
stimulus information. These results could
indicate a separation of stimulus storage
and executive processes, but the disso-
ciation does not seem to map onto a
dissociation between sensory and frontal
cortices.
Alternatively, the results may suggest
a very different way of thinking about in-
formation representation and executive
processes in the brain. Sensory and pre-
frontal cortices may both be organized
into predictive processing hierarchies,
with new bottom-up sensory inputs being
continuously combined with neuromodu-
latory inputs based on representations of
contextual information from past inputs
to create new mental representations
(e.g., Summerfield and Koechlin, 2008;
Kanai et al., 2015). These current and
remembered representations then in-
teract in a dynamic neural system that
enables continuous inferences and pre-
dictions to be made regarding current
and future inputs and appropriate re-
sponses to be made to achieve desired
future outcomes. Predictions and infer-
ences can be made at all stages along
the neural hierarchy: in early sensory cor-
tex, prefrontal cortex, and anywhere
in between. The distinction between
different levels of the hierarchy may lie in
quantitative differences in parameters
such as the time constants governing
reverberating circuits. There would be no
need for PFC to have a qualitatively
different neuroanatomical organization,
such as a process-specific organization,
while the rest of the brain is organized
by information domain. In such a neuro-
computational perspective, there is no
hard line between representation or stor-
age of information and the processes
that select, transform, and use that infor-
mation. Patterns of neural activity, and
patterns of relative strengths of synaptic
connections, are the manifestations of in-
formation storage. Executive processes,
on the other hand, are manifest by inter-
actions among all those stored represen-
tations resulting in changes in information
representation and changes in behavior.
The unified system thus can achieve
both stability and flexibility to optimally
deal with whatever the environment may
bring.
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